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1. Introduction  
Corruption is a longstanding problem in many post-Soviet countries. Since its independence in 
1991, Ukraine has gone through two revolutions − the Orange Revolution in 2004 and the 
Revolution of Dignity in 2014 – and in both cases, one of the catalysts was the fight against 
corruption. Yet reforms aiming to combat corruption have arguably not resulted in important 
changes (see for instance Grødeland (2010) for an evaluation of the post-2004 period and The 
Economist (2015) for a more recent assessment). As an illustration, Geoffrey Pyatt, US 
Ambassador to Ukraine, is cited in Åslund (2015) as claiming that actors working for Ukrainian 
national agencies who are responsible for the implementation of anti-corruption changes are in 
fact ‘making things [even] worse by openly and aggressively undermining reform[s]’. Anti-
corruption reforms should entail not only the elements of a ‘publicity stunt’, as was the case with 
the reform of the traffic police (Åslund, 2015). Such reforms should also go to the roots of 
endemic corruption in the country by tackling the improper dependencies and reducing the 
unprecedented role of oligarchs (Economist, 2015, Åslund, 2014) as well as by raising the quality 
of (higher) education through quantification (Denisova-Schmidt and Leontyeva 2014).  
This paper aims to assess the effects of an anti-corruption intervention on Ukrainian university 
students’ willingness to participate in an anti-corruption campaign and their moral judgment about 
corruption in general. Specifically, the intervention is defined as being exposed to an 
informational folder based on materials designed by the NGO Transparency International 
(https://www.transparency.org/) that point to the damage to the higher education system caused by 
corruption. To evaluate the intervention’s effectiveness, a field experiment was conducted in 
several universities in Lviv, a major city in western Ukraine, in the spring of 2015. In the course 
of a survey of students, 600 individuals were randomly chosen to be exposed to the anti-corruption 
folder (treatment group) or to a folder with information about the demographic situation in Lviv 
(control group).  
The results suggest that students who previously experienced corruptive behavior at the university 
level are more willing to participate in an anti-corruption campaign, while the average effect on all 
the students – including those without previous exposure to corruption – is statistically 
insignificant. Furthermore, we find that the intervention has an influence on students’ opinion of 
corruption in general: In the total sample and across various subgroups, the intervention by and 
large increases (at least in the short run) the perception that corruption is a part of society rather 
than a temporary phenomenon. In addition, those students with experience in dishonest or corrupt 
practices are induced to adopt a more negative view of corruption (calling it “bad” or “a crime”), 
possibly due to an effect of shaming. For those students without such experiences, we find some 
2 
indication that the intervention could, by teaching them about the dissemination of corrupt 
behavior, augment the acceptance of corruption through an increase in the view that “corruption is 
a means to solve problems”. Our heterogeneous effects therefore point to the possibility that, 
depending on previous exposure to corruption and cheating, the same intervention may have 
different impacts on different groups, which seems worth considering when designing anti-
corruption campaigns.  
Corruption in higher education − defined as ‘the abuse of entrusted power for private gain’ 
(Transparency International) and “the lack of academic integrity” (Heyneman, 2004, 2013) − 
might take place in different settings: from the university admissions process to the rules of 
academic integrity set for students, faculty and staff to the governance of educational institutions 
(Chapman, 2002, Chapman and Lindner, 2014, Hallak and Poisson 2007, Sweeney, Despota, and 
Lindner, 2013). All of these forms of corruption might influence the students’ values, beliefs, and 
lives, either directly or indirectly (Rumyantseva, 2005). In spite of the fact that corruption in 
higher education has a long history − the first reported cases of mishandled test scores date as far 
back as the time of the Ch’ing dynasty in China in 1644 − the wave of global attention it is 
currently experiencing only began in the 1990s (Heyneman, 2013). Some of the factors that have 
influenced this tendency include the movement towards mass higher education and the heightened 
competition between educational institutions for resources (Heyneman, 2013, Shaw, 2013, 
Chapman and Lindner, 2014).  
For decades, students in different countries have been actively involved in demanding reforms in 
higher education and beyond (Altbach 1966, 1979, 1981, 1989a, 1989b, 1989c, 1991, 1992, 2006, 
Klemencic 2014), which includes protests against corruption as recently witnessed for instance in 
Bulgaria (2013) and Ukraine (2004, 2013-14) (Altbach and Klemencic 2014, Klemencic 2014). 
Inspired by the students’ role in society, the aim of our study is to assess experimentally the 
effectiveness of an anti-corruption intervention on one aspect of students’ activism, namely the 
willingness to participate in anti-corruption campaigns, as well as the general moral judgement of 
corruption among students at Ukrainian universities.  
Experiments have a long tradition in social sciences and are considered to be the ‘gold standard’ 
for causal inference by many researchers, see for instance Imbens (2010). If properly 
implemented, experiments allow most credibly assessing the causal effect of an intervention by 
relying on less severe restrictions or assumptions than other statistical methods. Several lab, field, 
and natural experiments have been exploited to study corruption in various settings (Banuri and 
Eckel, 2012, Kubbe, and McBride, 2015), for instance its relation to cultural background. Barr and 
Serra (2010), for example, analyze the corrupt behavior of students with different countries of 
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origin studying in the UK based on lab experiments. They find that cultural background can 
predict corrupt behavior: students coming from highly corrupt countries might ‘import’ corrupt 
behavior to the UK. Analyzing the parking behavior of United Nations officials in New York in a 
natural experiment, Fisman and Miguel (2007) show that the number of diplomatic parking 
violations is strongly correlated with the level of corruption in the diplomats’ home countries. 
Besides cultural background, (perceived) fairness also appears to be an important aspect of 
corruptive behavior. Based on a lab experiment with US students, John, Loewenstein, and Rick 
(2014) for instance find that participants are more ready to cheat not because of monetary 
incentives, but because they know that others are cheating as well. This suggests that it is a 
comparison with others (rather than the monetary pay off) that might lead to an increase in 
cheating. The study outcomes potentially explain endemic corruption in some countries: if 
corruption is permissible for the government, it might also be so for citizens in general.  
Another strand of the experimental literature on corruption assesses the effectiveness of anti-
corruption activities (however, not specifically in the higher education sector as our study).  For 
instance, Olken (2007) tests the effects of top-down and bottom-up anti-corruption strategies in a 
field experiment in Indonesia. His results suggest that the top-down approach (external audits) is 
particularly effective in reducing manipulations with public funds, while the bottom-up approach 
(grass-roots monitoring) is essential in areas where individuals are involved directly, such as 
education and health (cf. Bertrand et al 2006). Gingerich, Oliveros, Corbacho, and Ruiz-Vega 
(2015) adopt an approach very much related to our one to evaluate the effect of an information 
campaign on the willingness to bribe in Costa Rica. They integrated an information experiment 
into a household survey (from late 2013 to early 2014), in which (among others) a flyer was 
randomized among respondents that graphically displayed an increase in the percentage of Costa 
Ricans who had personally witnessed an act of corruption from 2006 (16 percent) to 2011 (24 
percent).1  Exposure to the flyer significantly increases the willingness to bribe, pointing to a 
promoting effect of corruption (i.e. ‘corruption corrupts’). This is in line with the fairness 
considerations mentioned before and with the findings in our study that point to the possibility that 
learning about the dissemination of corruption may augment its acceptance.  
Comparably few experiments have been conducted on corruption in the educational sector. 
Armantier and Boly (2011), for example, conclude that larger bribes influence graders to 
                                                          
1 Information campaigns have also been conducted in other fields of research. For instance, Altmann, Falk, Jäger, and 
Zimmermann (2015) test the effects of brochures with information on job search strategies and the detrimental 
consequences of unemployment (among others) on the labor market outcomes of unemployed individuals in 
Germany. 
4 
‘overlook’ some mistakes and be more tolerant to bribe-givers in Quaqadougou (Burkina Faso). 
After continuing their research in Montreal (Canada), Armantier and Boly (2013) compare the 
results from three different settings, namely the field and the lab experiments in Quaqadougou and 
the lab experiment in Montreal. The results suggest that paying large bribes can be ambivalent: it 
might reduce the willingness to accept a bribe, but at the same time, it might promote 
reciprocation towards bribe-givers among those who accept bribes. Reinikka and Svensson (2004) 
investigate how the handling of a large-scale school-grant program in Uganda by local officials is 
affected by a large government-funded newspaper campaign, which is one of the rare other studies 
evaluating information campaigns on corruption in education.  Their instrumental variable and 
difference-in-difference estimates suggest that the campaign successfully increased schools’ and 
parents’ ability to monitor local officials and substantially reduced capture and corruption of 
public funds between 1995 and 2001. When compared to the results in Gingerich, Oliveros, 
Corbacho, and Ruiz-Vega (2015), this suggests that campaigns can have very different effects 
depending on the kind, presentation, scale, and addressee of information.   
To the best of our knowledge, the effectiveness of anti-corruption campaigns in universities has 
not yet been considered in the experimental literature. This particularly applies to countries like 
Ukraine, where corruption is endemic in all areas, including the education sector (see, for 
example, Kipen, 2002, Round and Rodgers, 2009, Osipian 2008a, 2008b, 2010, Kovalchuk and 
Koroliuk 2012, Klein, 2014a, 2014b, Denisova-Schmidt, Leontyeva, Prytula, 2014). Our paper 
aims to fill this gap, which appears interesting from a policy perspective, as policymakers and 
researchers may want to know whether such anti-corruption activities actually influence students’ 
behavior in a socially desirable way (in order to reduce corruption as witnessed in Reinikka and 
Svensson, 2004) or can even be counterproductive (see Gingerich, Oliveros, Corbacho, and Ruiz-
Vega, 2015).  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines the experimental research 
design and presents selected descriptive statistics on the collected data to verify the success of 
randomization. Section 3 presents the econometric methods (mean differences, OLS, and inverse 
probability tilting) by which the data are analyzed as well as the empirical results. Section 4 
concludes. 
 
2. Research design and data 
To evaluate the effectiveness of anti-corruption information campaigns, a randomized trial was 
conducted among university students in the city of Lviv, a major city in western Ukraine with a 
population of more than 700,000 and home to 26 universities and higher educational institutions. 
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The research design was set up in the following way: Students were asked to participate in a 
survey about their reasons or ambitions for studying, their study fields and habits, their 
experiences with corruption and informal practices in school and in university and their family 
backgrounds and other socio-economic characteristics. The students were approached by the 
interviewers on their campuses and first asked about their university and year of study, as only 
individuals studying on-site with at least 3 to 5 prior semesters were interviewed (to make sure the 
acquired a certain level of experience in the higher education system). Then, face-to-face 
interviews were conducted in which the interviewer filled out the questionnaire to maximize the 
number of answered questions.  
At a particular point in the interview, namely prior to any questions about university corruption, 
students were randomly provided with either a folder with information about the detrimental 
effects of corruption in the higher educational system (treatment group), or an information folder 
with (corruption-irrelevant) information on the social and demographical situation in Lviv (control 
group). The anti-corruption folder contained textual and visual information based on the materials 
of Transparency International, a leading NGO headquartered in Berlin with several national 
chapters (including one in Ukraine), which provides data and analysis on corruption worldwide. 
The folder provided a broad definition of corruption and specifically explained the types of 
corruption relevant to higher education that may or may not involve students. Furthermore, it also 
indicated the possible negative consequences of corruption that involves students and ended with a 
call not to participate in corruption and to encourage others to prevent corruption, see Appendix A 
for further details. In contrast, the folder of the control group contained general information about 
the demographics of Lviv, demographic projections, a social portrait of a citizen of Lviv and 
information about higher education possibilities in Lviv, see Appendix B.2  
Randomization was based on a simple timing rule. If the last digit of the interviewer’s electronic 
watch indicated an even minute as the student reached the part of the survey where the 
intervention took place, the anti-corruption folder was provided; if it indicated an odd minute, the 
general city information folder was given to the student. The latter was then asked to look 
carefully through the material, and the interview only continued after the respondent finished 
studying the folder. Among the survey questions prevailing after the intervention are moral 
judgments about corruption in general, informal practices among students, and whether the student 
would be willing to participate in an anti-corruption campaign at the university (by distributing 
                                                          
2 While we only used printed materials in our experiment, digital media play an important role these days and may 
have different impacts from the ones presented in this paper. Future research extending the present study might 
therefore also consider computer-based materials, short videos, presentations, and postings in social media accounts.  
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flyers), all of which serve as outcome variables (see Section 3).  
The representative study was conducted in March and April 2015 by the Fama sociological agency 
on behalf of a joint team of researchers from the Universities of St. Gallen and Fribourg 
(Switzerland) and the Ivan Franko National University of Lviv (Ukraine). The student sample was 
drawn from four selected public universities in Lviv and included 600 respondents studying in 
four main areas: social sciences (n=208, 34.7%), natural sciences (n=62, 10.3%), technical 
sciences (n=253, 42.2%) and the humanities (n=76, 12.7%), representing a majority of all 
students. Students in other disciplines, such as medicine, arts, or theology, were excluded due to 
their small share and the specificity of their courses. The participating students were of similar age 
(19-20 years) and males were slightly overrepresented (347 vs. 253 females). 315 (52.5%) of the 
600 interviewees were randomized into treatment and 285 (47.5%) into control. The difference 
from a 50% assignment into treatment and control, respectively, is not statistically significant on 
any conventional level when using the t-test. The study was conducted in Ukrainian, the native 
language of all individuals involved. Therefore, no language-based misunderstandings are to be 
expected. Due to the sensitive nature of the topic, anonymity was guaranteed to all respondents. 
Several respondents nevertheless had some doubts and questioned this anonymity. Therefore, a 
few of them refused to provide the interviewers with their dates of birth (15 cases or 2.5% of the 
sample). In general, however, item nonresponse was very low. For instance, only 8 students 
(1.3%) did not provide their parents’ education, while 7 (1.2%) did not report their parents’ labor 
market state. The number of non-responses regarding most other socio-economic variables was 
even smaller.    
(see Table 1 next page) 
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Table 1: Mean covariate values by treatment status  
Variable T = 0 T = 1 Diff p-value 
gender: male (binary) 0.554 
(0.030) 
0.578 
(0.029) 
0.024 
(0.042) 
0.577 
birth year 1995.079 
(0.051) 
1995.097 
(0.052) 
0.018 
(0.073) 
0.802 
family consists of both parents (binary) 0.880 
(0.020) 
0.855 
(0.021) 
-0.025 
(0.029) 
0.376 
at least one parent working (binary) 0.959 
(0.012) 
0.962 
(0.011) 
0.003 
(0.017) 
0.850 
both parents have at most intermediate education (binary) 0.371 
(0.030) 
0.298 
(0.027) 
-0.073 
(0.040)  
0.068 
number of siblings 1.004 
(0.056) 
1.083 
(0.051) 
0.079 
(0.076) 
0.295 
self-assessed family wealth: satisfactory (binary) 0.341 
(0.029) 
0.332 
(0.028) 
-0.009 
(0.040) 
0.830 
self-assessed family wealth: good (binary) 0.517 
(0.031) 
0.522 
(0.029) 
0.006 
(0.042) 
0.894 
self-assessed family wealth: very good (binary) 0.064 
(0.015) 
0.069 
(0.015) 
0.006 
(0.021) 
0.794 
main reason for studying: good education (binary) 0.371 
(0.030) 
0.315 
(0.027) 
-0.056 
(0.040) 
0.166 
main reason for studying: to find good job (binary) 0.461 
(0.031) 
0.522 
(0.029) 
0.062 
(0.042) 
0.146 
main reason for studying: to obtain a diploma (binary) 0.105 
(0.019) 
0.097 
(0.017) 
-0.008 
(0.026) 
0.756 
university id: 1 (binary) 0.367 
(0.030) 
0.329 
(0.028) 
-0.038 
(0.040) 
0.344 
university id: 2 (binary) 0.075 
(0.016) 
0.097 
(0.017) 
0.022  
(0.024) 
0.355 
university id: 3 (binary) 0.056 
(0.014) 
0.087 
(0.017) 
0.030 
(0.022) 
0.164 
study field: humanities (binary) 0.135 
(0.021) 
0.125 
(0.019) 
-0.010 
(0.029) 
0.720 
study field: social sciences (binary) 0.367 
(0.030) 
0.349 
(0.028) 
-0.018 
(0.041) 
0.667 
study field: engineering (binary) 0.412  
(0.030) 
0.419 
(0.029) 
0.007 
(0.042) 
0.873 
Urbanity of residential area before entering university (1: city,…,7: village) 4.528 
(0.119) 
4.426 
(0.117) 
-0.102 
(0.167) 
0.539 
study program without tuition fees (binary) 0.757 
(0.026) 
0.668 
(0.028) 
-0.089 
(0.038) 
0.021 
study year (1or 2) 1.547 
(0.031) 
1.509 
(0.029) 
-0.038 
(0.042) 
0.369 
Note: The reference category for “self-assessed family wealth” is “basic”; the reference category for “university id” is “4”; the reference category 
for “study field” is “natural sciences”. 
  
 
Table 1 reports the means of selected personal characteristics of the students across treatment 
status for the 556 individuals (93% of the sample) without missing information in any of the 
covariates reported. These include personal characteristics (gender, year of birth), family 
background (parents’ education and labor market state, indicators for family wealth, number of 
siblings), mean differences and p-values (of two sample t-tests). The statistical insignificance of 
most of these differences suggests that the randomization of the treatment was successful and that 
the minor item nonresponse issue did not compromise the randomization. Alone the mean 
difference in being inscribed in a “study program without tuition fees” is significant at the 5% 
level, while none of the remaining variables are significantly different across treatment states at 
the 10% level. As shown in Table 2, assignment is not statistically associated with a range of 
variables measuring previous experiences of informal practices, cheating, and corruption in school 
or university either (note that all of these variables were assessed prior to treatment randomization, 
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and that only the 575 observations without missing information in any of these variables are 
included).  
Table 2: Mean values of prior informal practices and corruption by treatment status 
Variable T = 0 T = 1  Diff p-
value  
had to make presents3 to the school teacher: books 1.584  
(0.060) 
1.611  
(0.056) 
0.027 
(0.082)  
0.738 
had to make presents to the school teacher: dishes 1.650  
(0.063) 
1.721  
(0.061) 
0.071 
(0.088)  
0.417 
had to make presents to the school teacher: jewelry 1.474  
(0.060) 
1.542  
(0.060) 
0.067 
(0.085) 
0.428 
had to make presents to the school teacher: cosmetics/fragrances 1.307  
(0.049)  
1.336  
(0.047) 
0.029 
(0.068) 
0.670 
had to make presents to the school teacher: home appliances 1.376  
(0.055) 
1.352  
(0.049) 
-0.024 
(0.073)  
0.746 
had to make presents to the school teacher: mobile phone 1.099  
(0.031) 
1.106  
(0.028)  
0.008 
(0.041)  
0.852 
had to make presents to the school teacher: computer / notebook 1.102  
(0.031) 
1.120 
(0.033) 
0.017 
(0.045) 
0.701 
friends or relatives solved their problems in daily life by using connections 2.931 
(0.058) 
2.993 
(0.056) 
0.063 
(0.081) 
0.437 
friends or relatives solved their problems in daily life by giving bribes 2.836 
(0.060) 
2.870 
(0.056) 
0.035 
(0.082) 
0.672 
I use crib sheets during the exam in university  3.511 
(0.070) 
3.439 
(0.065) 
-0.072 
(0.095) 
0.448 
I download coursework from the internet in university 2.241 
(0.072) 
2.252 
(0.071) 
0.012 
(0.102) 
0.909 
I buy coursework from the special companies or classmates 
 
1.719 
(0.066) 
1.777 
(0.065) 
0.058 
(0.093) 
0.528 
I write papers by myself, but copy and paste some chapters from the internet 
 
3.208 
(0.068) 
3.319 
(0.064) 
0.111 
(0.093) 
0.235 
I copy somebody’s work during examinations or tests 3.482 
(0.067) 
3.382 
(0.065) 
-0.100 
(0.094) 
0.289 
I deceive a professor while explaining problems associated with studies (for 
example, absence from lecture, failure to meet deadlines for written papers, 
failure to appear for an exam) 
2.380 
(0.074) 
2.256 
(0.070) 
-0.124 
(0.101) 
0.223 
I ask a professor for an individual treatment (for example, easing 
requirements, preferential treatment, exemption from an exam) 
1.675 
(0.062) 
1.548 
(0.054) 
-0.127 
(0.082) 
0.122 
I heard about bribing in universities 3.485 
(0.059) 
3.535 
(0.054) 
0.049 
(0.080) 
0.537 
I have personally been confronted with bribing in university 1.796 
(0.059) 
1.817 
(0.059) 
0.022  
(0.083) 
0.795 
Have you (your friends and relatives) observed violations during ZNO 
exams4 (bribes, presents, help from the on-site proctors)? 
2.770 
(0.032) 
2.754 
(0.033) 
-0.016 
(0.046) 
0.729 
Have you (your friends and relatives) observed violations when entering 
university (cases in admissions commissions, by preferential admissions)? 
2.653  
(0.034) 
2.631 
(0.035) 
-0.022 
(0.049) 
0.652 
Note: The scale for variables in the top panel (“had to make presents…“) ranges from 1=never to 5=systematically. The scale for variables in the 
bottom panel (“Have you…”) is 1=personally, 2=my friends or relatives, 3=no.  
 
The values of the variables in Table 2 suggest that informal, dishonest, and corrupt behavior is 
quite common. Even for such variables as “I buy coursework from special companies or 
classmates” and “I have personally been confronted with bribing in the university”, which have 
comparably low means, it needs to be pointed out that in either treatment group, roughly 40% and 
                                                          
3 Presents are an important part of Ukrainian academic culture, but the tradition of present-giving might be misused. 
Polese (2010) explained the difference between a present and a bribe: ‘if [a professor/school teacher] receive[s] it, it is 
a gift, if [a professor/school teacher] demand[s] it, it is a bribe’. 
4 The Ukrainian Zovnishnie Nezalezhne Otsinjuvannia (ZNO) (Engl.: External Independent Assessment) are tests that 
serve as both school finals and university entrance examinations. 
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almost half of the students, respectively, picked an answer that is different from “never”. In an 
open question following the item “I have personally been confronted with bribing in the 
university”, students were asked to describe how they experienced this/these situation(s). Some 
stated that they had bribed due to a lack of preparation for the exam or missing too many classes, 
while others said that they were pursuing a university degree as a mere credential, without any 
regard for how to obtain it (‘do not want to study, but need a degree’). Furthermore, good marks 
are important for receiving a state scholarship and this might be also a reason for bribing a lecturer 
(‘needed a few points to get a scholarship’). Finally, some students stated that they were forced to 
bribe by their lecturers (‘a lecturer demanded a bribe’) or told that if they do not, they might suffer 
(‘if you do not bribe, you will be expelled’). 
Concerning the outcomes of interest, we evaluate the effect of the anti-corruption folders against 
the Lviv-based folders on the students’ willingness to participate in an anti-corruption campaign 
on campus by distributing flyers to other students (binary indicator). 5 If they agreed to the 
proposition (willingness=1), they were asked to leave either their phone number or e-mail address 
to make the intention credible, so that they might be contacted again. In addition, we also look at 
the folders’ impact on the students’ moral assessment of corruption in general. To this end, they 
were asked the question: “What, according to your understanding, does corruption mean?” and 
had to choose the most appropriate answer out of the following list: “Corruption is…” (a) “bad”, 
(b) “a crime”, (c) “a necessity”, (d) “a means to solve problems”, (e) “a means of income”, (f) 
“compensation for low salaries”, (g) “a part of life”, (h) “a temporary phenomenon “, (i) “a 
tradition”, or (j) “a national particularity”. Each option may be represented by a dummy variable, 
with all of the dummies adding up to one if any of (a) to (j) was picked (because only the answer 
that was most important to the student should be chosen). It therefore needs to be pointed out that 
by the way the question is asked, the treatment’s (short run) impact on the relative importance of 
the various options may be assessed, rather than the absolute (i.e. cardinal) change in importance. 
Nine observations (1.5%) did not pick any option, resulting in their dummies remaining at zero. 
See the next section for the means of the outcome variables among controls as well as their mean 
differences across the treated and control groups.6  
                                                          
5 Surveyors reported that when asking the question ‘Would you be interested in participating in anti-corruption 
campaigns as a volunteer?’, many respondents asked about a honorarium. 
6 It is worth mentioning that our survey also contains information on the personal assessment of how frequently various 
cheating techniques are applied by university students in their courses and exams. Although this information was 
asked after the treatment assignment, none of these variables are significantly different across the treatment state. This 
is to be expected, as the treatment, which is received on the individual level just shortly before this question is asked, 
should arguably not affect the (perceived) cheating frequency of students in general. Significant effects would 
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3. Methods and results  
We use three econometric methods to assess the effectiveness of the anti-corruption intervention. 
First, we simply take (and test for) mean differences in the various outcomes of the treatment and 
control groups. Under successful randomization, which implies that the treated and control groups 
are comparable in any observed or unobserved characteristics (that potentially affect the 
outcomes), this yields an unbiased estimate of the causal effect of our intervention. Even though 
the observed characteristics appear to be satisfactorily balanced in our sample (see Section 2), 
some minor differences remain nevertheless across the groups (in particular the dummy variable 
on tuition fees). We therefore also consider two methods that control for differences in the 
observed characteristics displayed in Table 1. The first approach consists of an OLS regression of 
the respective outcome on the treatment status and the covariates, which linearly controls for 
differences in the latter variables. However, a potential drawback of OLS are its parametric (i.e. 
linear) restrictions, which may be violated in reality, and the omission of interactions between the 
treatment and the covariates.  
As an alternative, we thus also consider a semiparametric method that is based on the treatment 
propensity score, i.e. the conditional probability to receive (or not receive) the treatment given the 
observed covariates, see for instance Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) for a survey of such 
estimators that do not rely on a particular functional form of the outcome model. To be concise, 
we apply the so-called inverse probability tilting (IPT) method as proposed by Graham et al. 
(2012),7 which reweights observations by the inverse of the treatment propensity score before 
taking mean differences. In contrast to standard (inverse probability) weighting, in which the 
propensity score is typically estimated by logit or probit models, IPT uses a particular method of 
moments estimator for the propensity score. An attractive particularity of IPT over standard 
weighting is that it exactly balances the means (or even further moments) of the covariates of 
interest in such a way that the covariate means are identical in the treated and control groups. 
Furthermore, this estimator may be more efficient than other propensity score-based weighting 
approaches, see Graham et al. (2012). 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
therefore point to a change in the students’ response behavior concerning these delicate questions, but this change is 
absent in our analysis (results are available upon request).    
7 To this end, we use the stata command “iptATE” provided by the authors. 
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Table 3: Effects in the total sample 
 
total sample   mean difference 
 
OLS 
  
IPT 
outcome 
Control 
mean effect se p-value effect se p-value effect se p-value 
would participate in campaign 0.09 0.00 0.02 0.93 0.01 0.02 0.63 0.01 0.02 0.61 
corruption is …bad 0.10 -0.01 0.02 0.69 0.01 0.03 0.84 0.00 0.03 0.95 
… a crime 0.42 0.04 0.04 0.38 0.03 0.04 0.48 0.04 0.04 0.39 
… a necessity 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.87 0.00 0.01 0.81 0.00 0.01 0.71 
… a means to solve problems 0.18 -0.01 0.03 0.65 -0.02 0.03 0.51 -0.02 0.03 0.51 
… a means of income 0.10 -0.02 0.02 0.51 -0.03 0.02 0.31 -0.03 0.02 0.29 
… a compensation for low salaries 0.05 -0.01 0.02 0.65 -0.01 0.02 0.58 -0.01 0.02 0.51 
… a part of life 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 
… a temporary phenomenon 0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.08 -0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.01 
… a tradition 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.00 
… a national particularity 0.05 -0.01 0.02 0.64 -0.01 0.02 0.55 -0.01 0.02 0.61 
observations 285 600     556     556     
Note: Standard errors (se) and p-values (p-value) are based on asymptotic approximations.  
 
Table 3 provides the results for the total sample. The second column provides the various mean 
outcomes among controls, while the third column gives the mean differences between treated and 
controls – i.e. the experimental estimates of the effects. The fourth and fifth columns contain the 
(heteroscedasticity robust) standard errors and p-values. The OLS (IPT) estimates are provided in 
columns 6-8 (9-11). None of the methods suggests that the willingness to participate in anti-
corruption activities (“would participate in a campaign”) is importantly affected by the 
intervention in the total sample. While 9% of the control observations declare a willingness to take 
part, the treatment hardly increases this figure and is far from being significant, no matter whether 
mean differences, OLS, or IPT are considered. However, some interesting patterns prevail 
concerning the moral assessment of corruption (reflected by the remaining outcome variables). 
First of all, we notice that the intervention does not statistically significantly affect the relative 
importance of the negative statements that corruption is something “bad” or “a crime”. While the 
latter is by far the most frequently selected answer among controls (42%), the treatment effects of 
3-4 percentage points cannot be distinguished from zero. Likewise, for the statements that 
corruption “is a necessity”, “a means to solve problems”, “a means of income”, or “a 
compensation for low salaries”, no significant effects are found.  
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Table 4: Effects among students who were confronted with bribing in university  
 
At least once confronted with bribing   mean difference OLS  IPT 
outcome Control mean effect se p-value effect se p-value effect se 
p-
value 
would participate in campaign 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.17 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.08 
corruption is …bad 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.61 0.04 0.04 0.25 0.04 0.03 0.27 
… a crime 0.34 0.09 0.06 0.11 0.09 0.06 0.18 0.10 0.06 0.09 
… a necessity 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.74 0.00 0.02 0.87 0.00 0.02 0.86 
… a means to solve problems 0.24 -0.04 0.05 0.47 -0.05 0.05 0.34 -0.05 0.05 0.31 
… a means of income 0.09 -0.01 0.03 0.76 0.00 0.04 0.95 -0.01 0.03 0.80 
… a compensation for low salaries 0.08 -0.04 0.03 0.11 -0.05 0.03 0.13 -0.04 0.03 0.11 
… a part of life 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.19 0.01 0.01 0.29 0.02 0.01 0.22 
… a temporary phenomenon 0.05 -0.04 0.02 0.03 -0.04 0.02 0.04 -0.04 0.02 0.03 
… a tradition 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.10 0.03 0.02 0.05 
… a national particularity 0.06 -0.03 0.02 0.22 -0.04 0.03 0.17 -0.04 0.03 0.11 
observations 141 287     257     257     
Note: Standard errors (se) and p-values (p-value) are based on asymptotic approximations.  
 
In contrast, the folder appears to have affected the perception of the prevalence of corruption in 
society: The likelihood of choosing the statement “corruption is a part of life” is increased by 2 
percentage points (independent of the method considered), which triples the average in the control 
group (1%). Furthermore, the answer “corruption is a tradition” rises by 4 percentage points (or 
quintuples from 1% in the control group), while “corruption is a temporary phenomenon” 
decreases by 2-3 percentage points. Not significantly affected is “corruption is a national 
particularity”. One could come to a quite disillusioning conclusion when looking at the total 
sample: While no significant effects were found on the willingness to be proactive against 
corruption or on the moral judgment that corruption is something negative, it only increased (at 
least in the short run) the view that it is an integral part of life. From a policymaker’s perspective, 
this may even be an undesirable effect, as it may induce individuals to engage in corrupt behavior 
themselves, given that they think others do it as well (see also the discussion of the results of 
Table 7 further below). 
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Table 5: Effects among students who were never confronted with bribing in university  
 
Never confronted with bribing   Mean difference OLS  IPT 
outcome 
Control 
mean effect se p-value effect se p-value effect se p-value 
would participate in campaign 0.11 -0.05 0.03 0.16 -0.05 0.03 0.17 -0.05 0.03 0.16 
corruption is …bad 0.12 -0.04 0.03 0.31 -0.02 0.04 0.54 -0.01 0.04 0.69 
… a crime 0.51 -0.02 0.06 0.70 -0.01 0.06 0.91 0.00 0.05 0.94 
… a necessity 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.49 -0.01 0.01 0.50 -0.01 0.01 0.57 
… a means to solve problems 0.13 0.01 0.04 0.77 -0.01 0.04 0.78 -0.01 0.04 0.84 
… a means of income 0.11 -0.02 0.03 0.51 -0.05 0.04 0.21 -0.06 0.04 0.08 
… a compensation for low salaries 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.19 0.02 0.02 0.40 0.02 0.02 0.35 
… a part of life 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.22 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.04 
… a temporary phenomenon 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.84 -0.02 0.02 0.18 -0.03 0.02 0.07 
… a tradition 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.02 
… a national particularity 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.68 0.02 0.02 0.41 0.02 0.02 0.35 
observations 144 313     299     299     
Note: Standard errors (se) and p-values (p-value) are based on asymptotic approximations.  
 
However, the picture changes when investigating effect heterogeneity of our intervention across 
particular subgroups. In a first step, we only look at individuals who claim to have been 
confronted with bribing at least once in their university studies (one of the variables in Table 2); 
see the results in Table 4. For this sample, we find a lower willingness to participate in the 
campaign among controls (6%) than in the total sample, but a larger treatment effect that lies 
between 5 and 7 percentage points. Under OLS and IPT, the impact is even significant at the 10%. 
Furthermore, the control mean of “corruption is a crime” (34%) is also lower than in the total 
sample, but again effect estimates are larger (9-10 percentage points) and, in the case of IPT, 
significant at the 10% level. This may point to an effect of learning or shaming (at least in the very 
short run) evoked by the intervention, inducing this group (i) to catch up with the total population 
in terms of the likelihood of assessing corruption primarily as a crime and (ii) to actively do 
something about the problem. Similar to the total population, significantly negative and positive 
effects are found for the statements that “corruption is a temporary phenomenon” and “corruption 
is a tradition”, respectively. For the group of students not confronted with bribing (Table 5), on the 
other hand, the effects on the willingness to participate in the campaign are negative, but not 
significant at any conventional level. The effects on “corruption is a part of life”, “corruption is a 
tradition” and “corruption is a temporary phenomenon” are by and large in line with those in the 
total sample.   
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Table 6: Effects among students buying a course paper or other written work 
 
Bought at least once a course 
paper or other written work   mean difference 
 
OLS  IPT 
outcome 
Contr
ol 
mean effect se p-value effect se p-value effect se p-value 
would participate in campaign 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.61 0.05 0.03 0.15 0.05 0.03 0.15 
corruption is …bad 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.10 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.04 0.02 
… a crime 0.34 0.11 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.13 0.11 0.06 0.06 
… a necessity 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.86 0.00 0.02 0.96 -0.01 0.02 0.76 
… a means to solve problems 0.28 -0.13 0.05 0.01 -0.16 0.06 0.01 -0.16 0.05 0.00 
… a means of income 0.08 -0.01 0.03 0.75 0.00 0.04 0.92 0.00 0.03 0.96 
… a compensation for low salaries 0.07 -0.03 0.03 0.41 -0.01 0.03 0.74 -0.02 0.03 0.56 
… a part of life 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.12 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.03 
… a temporary phenomenon 0.06 -0.05 0.03 0.07 -0.07 0.02 0.01 -0.06 0.02 0.00 
… a tradition 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.22 0.02 0.02 0.25 0.02 0.02 0.21 
… a national particularity 0.06 -0.02 0.03 0.58 -0.03 0.03 0.26 -0.02 0.03 0.37 
observations 112 242     218     218     
Note: Standard errors (se) and p-values (p-value) are based on asymptotic approximations.  
 
Table 6 contains the estimates for the subgroup of students who stated that they have at least once 
(i.e. more often than never) bought coursework from special agencies or classmates (one of the 
variables in Table 2), which is a form of noncompliance to academic standards. While the positive 
effects on the campaign dummy are not statistically significant, we find similarly strong effects on 
“corruption is a crime” as in Table 4, with IPT and mean differences being significant at the 10% 
level. Furthermore, the likelihood of stating that “corruption is bad” is increased, while that of 
“corruption is a means for solving problems” is considerably reduced (by 13 to 16 percentage 
points). This appears to be in line with the aforementioned effects of learning and shaming, 
entailing a reassessment of the moral judgment on corrupt behavior. The effects on “corruption is 
a part of life” and “corruption is a temporary phenomenon” are again in line with those in the total 
sample. Concerning those stating that they have never bought coursework from special agencies or 
classmates (Table 7), a striking finding is that the probability of stating that “corruption is bad” is 
reduced (borderline significant), while “corruption is a means for solving problems” is increased. 
It seems that those not engaging in unethical practices become more aware about the 
dissemination of corrupt behavior and consider it to be a supposed social norm, which may have 
socially undesirable effects on their own behavior. This is in line with the effects of the survey-
based information experiment of Gingerich, Oliveros, Corbacho, and Ruiz-Vega (2015) on the 
willingness to bribe in Costa Rica.   
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Table 7: Effects among students who never bought a course paper or other written work 
Never bought a course paper or 
other written work   mean difference OLS  IPT 
outcome 
Control 
mean effect se p-value effect se p-value effect se p-value 
would participate in campaign 0.11 -0.01 0.03 0.71 0.00 0.03 0.89 0.00 0.03 0.94 
corruption is …bad 0.13 -0.06 0.03 0.08 -0.05 0.03 0.12 -0.05 0.03 0.12 
… a crime 0.48 -0.01 0.05 0.82 -0.02 0.05 0.74 -0.01 0.05 0.85 
… a necessity 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.95 -0.01 0.01 0.56 -0.01 0.01 0.57 
… a means to solve problems 0.12 0.06 0.04 0.10 0.07 0.04 0.09 0.08 0.04 0.05 
… a means of income 0.11 -0.02 0.03 0.59 -0.04 0.03 0.23 -0.05 0.03 0.11 
… a compensation for low salaries 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.17 0.00 0.02 0.99 0.00 0.02 0.93 
… a part of life 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.34 0.01 0.01 0.26 0.01 0.01 0.23 
… a temporary phenomenon 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.61 -0.01 0.01 0.46 -0.01 0.01 0.42 
… a tradition 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.01 
… a national particularity 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.90 0.00 0.02 1.00 0.00 0.02 0.85 
observations 173 357     337     337     
 Note: Standard errors (se) and p-values (p-value) are based on asymptotic approximations.  
 
The final heterogeneity analysis we performed was to consider females and males separately 
(Tables 8 and 9), motivated by empirical findings that gender matters with regard to many aspects 
of corruption (see for instance Swamy, Knack, Lee, Azfar, 2001, and Jetter and Walker, 2015). 
Although some control means differ across gender (“corruption is bad”, “corruption is a means for 
solving problems”) no striking differences were found in terms of the intervention effects. In 
neither sample is the impact on the campaign dummy significant. Furthermore, the results for 
“corruption is a part of life”, “corruption is a temporary phenomenon”, and “corruption is a 
tradition” are qualitatively in line with those in the total sample, but generally less significant.  
 
Table 8: Effects among female students 
females   mean difference OLS  IPT 
outcome 
Control 
mean effect se p-value effect se p-value effect se p-value 
would participate in campaign 0.12 -0.02 0.04 0.69 0.02 0.04 0.58 0.02 0.04 0.54 
corruption is …bad 0.13 -0.03 0.04 0.43 -0.03 0.04 0.53 -0.03 0.04 0.46 
… a crime 0.46 0.01 0.06 0.92 -0.02 0.07 0.81 0.00 0.06 0.94 
… a necessity 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.93 -0.01 0.02 0.74 -0.01 0.02 0.54 
… a means to solve problems 0.12 0.02 0.04 0.61 0.03 0.05 0.57 0.02 0.05 0.63 
… a means of income 0.10 0.02 0.04 0.68 0.00 0.04 0.94 0.00 0.04 0.96 
… a compensation for low salaries 0.04 -0.03 0.02 0.22 -0.01 0.02 0.51 -0.02 0.02 0.38 
… a part of life 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.60 0.01 0.02 0.40 0.02 0.01 0.29 
… a temporary phenomenon 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.53 -0.02 0.02 0.30 -0.02 0.01 0.30 
… a tradition 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.01 
… a national particularity 0.07 -0.03 0.03 0.33 -0.04 0.03 0.20 -0.03 0.03 0.19 
observations 122 253     241     241     
Note: Standard errors (se) and p-values (p-value) are based on asymptotic approximations. 
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In conclusion, our estimates suggest that the intervention increases (at least in the short run) the 
perception of corruption as being part of society. However, in the total sample, this does not 
materialize in statistically significant changes in the willingness to participate in an anti-corruption 
campaign or to adopt a more negative moral judgment of corruption. In contrast, the intervention 
seems to induce the (non-negligible) subgroup of students with experience in dishonest or corrupt 
practices to potentially join the campaign or to worsen their view about corruption. For those 
without such experience, we find some indication that the intervention could, by learning about 
the dissemination of corrupt behavior, increase the acceptance of corruption. The heterogeneous 
effects therefore point to the possibility that, depending on their previous exposure to corruption 
and cheating, the same intervention may have a socially desirable impact on one group, while 
being at best ineffective for the other. This seems an interesting point of consideration for 
institutions and policymakers designing and running anti-corruption campaigns. As a word of 
caution, however, it needs to be borne in mind that our intervention is rather small in scale (which 
may affect the generalizability of our results to more comprehensive campaigns) and that only 
short-term effects are captured by the survey. Finally, reporting bias may be an issue in questions 
on such a sensitive topic like corruption (note, however, that reporting bias should be balanced for 
any questions asked prior to the random treatment assignment).         
 
Table 9: Effects among male students 
 
males   mean difference OLS  IPT 
Outcome 
control 
mean effect se p-value effect se p-value effect se p-value 
would participate in campaign 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.73 0.02 0.03 0.42 0.02 0.03 0.44 
corruption is …bad 0.09 0.01 0.03 0.81 0.02 0.03 0.57 0.02 0.03 0.57 
… a crime 0.46 0.06 0.05 0.28 0.06 0.05 0.27 0.07 0.05 0.21 
… a necessity 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.90 0.00 0.01 0.96 0.00 0.01 0.95 
… a means to solve problems 0.18 -0.04 0.04 0.33 -0.05 0.04 0.26 -0.05 0.04 0.22 
… a means of income 0.06 -0.04 0.03 0.19 -0.03 0.03 0.34 -0.03 0.03 0.29 
… a compensation for low salaries 0.06 0.00 0.03 0.86 0.00 0.03 0.90 0.00 0.03 0.94 
… a part of life 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02 
… a temporary phenomenon 0.02 -0.03 0.02 0.09 -0.05 0.02 0.02 -0.05 0.02 0.02 
… a tradition 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.12 0.02 0.01 0.19 0.02 0.01 0.20 
… a national particularity 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.79 0.00 0.02 0.99 0.00 0.02 0.96 
observations 184 347     315     315     
Note: Standard errors (se) and p-values (p-value) are based on asymptotic approximations.  
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Conclusion  
In this paper, we experimentally assessed the impact of an anti-corruption intervention − an 
informational folder based on materials developed by Transparency International − on university 
students in the Ukrainian city of Lviv. Students who had previously been confronted with bribing 
were more willing to participate in an anti-corruption campaign, while no significant effect was 
found in the total sample. Furthermore, the intervention increased the overall perception that 
corruption was a (long-term) part of society rather than a temporary phenomenon, both in the total 
sample and in various subgroups. In addition, students with experience in corrupt practices 
adopted a more negative view of corruption, possibly due to shaming. For those without such 
experiences, however, the treatment might have augmented their acceptance of corruption by 
teaching them about its dissemination, which is in line with the findings of Gingerich, Oliveros, 
Corbacho and Ruiz-Vega (2015) concerning an information experiment in Costa Rica.  
The ambivalence of the results suggests that anti-corruption materials may have a different impact 
(also in terms of social desirability) on students involved in university-level corruption compared 
to students without such experiences. In particular, the latter group might learn about the means 
and possibilities of corruption through anti-corruption materials, which could induce them to make 
use of them to a larger extent. In this context, it is important to point out that corruption might not 
only be initiated by the faculty, but also come from the students themselves, who frequently resort 
to bribes in the following situations: a) too many missed classes; b) the necessity to get a formal 
degree rather than an education; c) the opportunity to receive a state scholarship.  
The heterogeneous impact of the intervention across various subgroups appears to be an important 
aspect of consideration for the design of anti-corruption activities. At the same time, it needs to be 
emphasized that the treatment investigated is rather small in scale and that only short-term effects 
are captured by the survey. This may affect the generalizability of our results to more 
comprehensive campaigns. Future research might therefore consider a larger set of interventions 
(print, audio-visual, and social media) to shed more light on (the optimal mix of) a broader range 
of anti-corruption activities.  
In general, research on corruption in higher education is vital and should be intensified. One 
important reason is that students who cheat at university could be induced to do so later in their 
working life, for example, by presenting the ideas of their co-workers as their own (analogous to 
writing a university paper by copying and pasting text from the internet), by filling out and turning 
in false expense reports (using cheat sheets during exams at school), or by giving employers a 
false reason for missing work (giving a professor a false reason for missing a class or exam) (see 
the discussion in Grimes, 2004). Such a system likely produces a mismatch between qualifications 
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and (cognitive or social) competencies on the one hand, and decision power in the economy and 
politics on the other. The massification of higher education might also contribute to this 
phenomenon: about 80% of young Ukrainians enter universities and finish them on time (Bastedo, 
Batkhuyag, Prates and Prytula, 2009). Young people without a degree have almost no chances on 
the job market and no real alternatives: the system of vocational training is insufficient. This 
would imply that disproportionately many individuals who lack the skills or integrity to finish 
their university studies without cheating attain positions of high responsibility with potentially 
detrimental effects on the economy and society (including social cohesion and political stability).  
For Ukraine as a whole, our fears appear even more pertinent, since our study was conducted in 
the western part of Ukraine, which was found to have a relatively low level of corruption in 
comparison to other regions in the country for instance in Denisova-Schmidt and Huber (2014) 
and Foster (2015).  
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Appendix A: Folder 1 (treatment group) 
Folder 1 was a color-printed booklet. It was made using materials developed by Transparency 
International8 and included the following information:  
- the position of Ukraine in Corruption Perception Index: In its 2014 index of 175 countries, 
Transparency International ranked Ukrainian corruption in 142nd place;9 
- the definition of corruption: the abuse of entrusted power for collective and private gain in 
monetary and non-monetary forms;10  
- some forms of corruption: bribery, collusion, conflict of interest, fraud, and nepotism, see 
picture 1, plus some areas of corruption: politics, courts, business, the healthcare system, 
police, and education (Corruption in the UK: Overview and Policy Recommendations, 2011; 
Corruption: A Beginner’s Guide, 2012);  
- examples of corruption in higher education without student involvement (manipulation of 
finances, university properties, accreditation) as well as examples of corruption in higher 
education with student involvement (copying off, plagiarism, cheating the faculty, bribes for 
grades and other preferential treatment) and their negative consequences (Global Corruption 
Report: Education, 2013).    
The folder ends with the call for participation in anti-corruption campaigns organized in Lviv.  
 
 
 
Picture 1: Some forms of corruption: bribery, collusion, conflict of interest, fraud, and nepotism. Source: Graphic by the 
authors based on Transparency International: “Corruption: A Beginner’s Guide,” December 201211  
                                                          
8 See the campaign ‘Unmask the corrupt’: http://www.transparency.org/unmask_the_corrupt/en/ 
(accessed on August 15th 2015)  
9 http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results (accessed on August 15th 2015) 
10 http://www.transparency.org.ru/dokumenty/missiia (accessed on August 15th 2015) 
11 http://www.transparency.org.uk/our-work/publications/10-publications/454-corruption-a-
beginners-guide-what-is-corruption. (accessed on August 15th 2015) 
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Appendix B: Folder 2 (control group) 
Folder 2 was also a color-printed booklet. It was made using materials developed by the City 
Institute in Lviv and included the following information, which was not relevant to the discussion 
on corruption:  
− the current demographic situation in Lviv and its forecast in the Ukrainian context and in 
comparison with other European countries;12 
− the population of Lviv: social characteristics, hobbies and leisure activities;13  
− higher education in Lviv, including the number of schools, students, degree and discipline 
distribution, see picture 2.  
 
 
Picture 2: Higher education in Lviv.  
Source: City Institute, Lviv14  
 
 
                                                          
12http://city-institute.org/ Socio/Demographic.jpg and http://city-institute.org/ 
Socio/Demographic_forecast.jpg (accessed on August 15th 2015) 
13 http://city-institute.org/ Socio/Social_portrait.jpg and http://city-institute.org/ Socio/Free_time.jpg 
(accessed on August 15th 2015) 
14 http://city-institute.org/Socio/Students.jpg (accessed on August 15th 2015) 
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